S. Rept. 109-101 - 109th Congress (2005-2006)
July 12, 2005, As Reported by the Finance Committee

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Senate Report 109-101 - APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003




[Senate Report 109-101]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



                                                       Calendar No. 158
109th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    109-101

======================================================================



 
 APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE 
                   FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

                                _______
                                

                 July 12, 2005.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

  Mr. Grassley, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                      [To accompany S.J. Res. 18]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 18) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
 I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee.........................2
    A. Report of the Committee on Finance.............................2
    B. Background.....................................................2
        1. The Government of Burma...............................     2
        2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (the 
            Act).................................................     2
        3. Procedures for Renewing the Import Restrictions 
            Contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
            2003.................................................     3
        4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 18...............     3
        5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade 
            Sanctions Against Burma..............................     4
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution.........................10
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......12

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................13

              I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE


                 A. Report of the Committee on Finance

    The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint 
resolution (S.J. Res. 18) approving the renewal of import 
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass.

                             B. Background


                       1. THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA

    Burma is governed by a military junta that took power in 
September 1988. The junta, the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), violently suppressed pro-democracy 
demonstrators in September 1988. The junta allowed elections to 
a National Assembly in 1990, but it nullified the results when 
the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won most of 
the seats. Since 1990, reports from human rights organizations 
and the U.S. State Department have described a pattern of SPDC 
policies featuring the suppression of political liberties, 
jailing of thousands of political prisoners (more than 1,000 
estimated imprisoned in July 2005), widespread physical abuses 
against civilians, the impressment of civilians into military 
service, and the conscription of thousands of civilians for 
work on economic projects.
    On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred 
people assaulted the opposition NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
and her supporters near Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. 
The attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development 
Association, a pro-government mass organization. Some NLD 
supporters were killed, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD 
leaders were taken into custody. The government closed NLD 
offices in the country.

       2. THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003 (THE ACT)

    In response to the May 30th attack, the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003 was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) on 
June 4, 2003. A revised version of the legislation was 
introduced in the Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter 
version, S. 1215, passed the Senate with an amendment on June 
11, 2003, by a recorded vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330 
passed with an amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote 
of 418-2, 1 Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed 
version of H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a 
recorded vote of 94-1. The legislation was presented to the 
President on July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the 
President on July 28, 2003 (Pub. L. 108-61).
    As enacted, the Act generally bans imports from Burma, 
affecting mainly imports of Burmese textiles and garments. U.S. 
imports of these products from Burma rose from nearly $60 
million in 1994 to $408 million in 2001 before falling to $297 
million in 2002, according to Department of Commerce 
statistics. Total imports from Burma in 2002 were $356 million. 
The ban on imports will remain until the President certifies to 
Congress that the SPDC has made major progress to end human 
rights violations, including rapes, forced and child labor, and 
conscription of child-soldiers, released political prisoners, 
allowed political, religious, and civil liberties, and reached 
agreement with the NLD for a civilian government chosen through 
democratic elections. The Act also freezes Burmese assets in 
the United States and requires the United States to oppose aid 
to Burma by international financial institutions.
    Pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act, the import ban will 
expire one year from the date of enactment unless a joint 
resolution (``renewal resolution'') approving a one-year 
renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to the 
anniversary of the date of enactment. The Act also provides 
that the import ban may be renewed for a maximum of three years 
from the date of enactment, i.e. until July 28, 2006. Last 
year, on June 14, 2004, the House passed H.J. Res. 97, by a 
recorded vote of 372-2, approving the renewal of the import ban 
until July 28, 2005. On June 24, 2004, the Senate passed the 
House-passed version by a recorded vote of 96-1. The 
legislation was signed into law by the President on July 7, 
2004 (Pub. L. 108-272).
    The purpose of S.J. Res. 18 is to comply with the Act's 
requirement in order to renew the import ban for another year, 
i.e. until July 28, 2006. An identical resolution (H.J. Res. 
52) was passed by the House on June 21, 2005 by a recorded vote 
of 432-2. H.J. Res. 52 was placed on the Senate Calendar on 
June 22, 2005.

  3. PROCEDURES FOR RENEWING THE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE 
               BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

    Section 9(c)(2)(B) of the Act incorporates the procedures 
set forth in section 152(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the 
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)), 
for consideration of a renewal resolution to renew the import 
ban for another year.
    Pursuant to those procedures, a renewal resolution 
introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Finance 
Committee, which is afforded 30 days in which the Senate is in 
session to consider and report the resolution. A renewal 
resolution is not amendable. If the Committee does not report 
the resolution within that period, it is in order for any 
Member favoring the resolution to move to discharge the 
Committee from further consideration of the resolution.
    If, as in this case, a renewal resolution is introduced in 
the Senate before receipt of an identical resolution from the 
House, and the House passes its resolution before the Committee 
reports the Senate measure, then upon receipt of the House-
passed measure the House resolution shall be placed on the 
Senate calendar and the Committee shall continue to report the 
Senate measure or be discharged from further consideration of 
the Senate measure, as noted. After the Committee reports the 
Senate measure, the vote on passage in the Senate shall then be 
on the identical House-passed measure.

               4. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF S.J. RES. 18

    The Committee considered S.J. Res. 18 in open executive 
session on June 28, 2005. The Chairman recessed that meeting 
until 9:00 a.m. on June 29, 2005. At that time, the Chairman 
reconvened the meeting and the Committee voted unanimously, by 
voice vote and without amendment, to favorably report S.J. Res. 
18, Approving the Renewal of Import Restrictions Contained in 
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

   5. REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE TRADE SANCTIONS 
                             AGAINST BURMA

    On May 23, 2005, the State Department submitted to Congress 
a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, as 
required by section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003. At the request of the Chairman, that 
report was made a part of the record of the Committee's 
consideration of S.J. Res. 18. The State Department report is 
reprinted below:

           INFORMATION ON U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

                      I. Introduction and Summary

    Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of P.L. 108-61 (the Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003), this report reviews 
bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human rights and 
democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act's 
trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in 
Burma and the furtherance or United States policy objectives.
    Continued pressure by the U.S. Government sends a clear 
signal that the United States expects Burma's junta to take 
meaningful steps toward genuine national reconciliation and the 
establishment of democracy. Such pressure also serves as a 
strong symbol of support for the members of the democratic 
opposition, as they continue their struggle inside the country. 
Many of those who have fled from the oppression inside Burma 
have supported the U.S. position and have called for other 
countries to follow the U.S. lead.
    The Administration continues diplomatic efforts, at all 
levels, to encourage other nations to sustain pressure on the 
Burmese junta. Some governments are able to offer little more 
than public support for a democratic transition, but it is 
through such sustained public messages that an atmosphere of 
change can come to Burma. U.S. punitive measures and calls for 
others to follow suit have not damaged U.S. relations with 
countries other than Burma. To date no other country has 
implemented U.S.-style economic sanctions. Cooperation on Burma 
issues with other members of the international community 
continues at the UN and in other multilateral fora, such as the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Financial 
Action Task Force.

                II. Bilateral and Multilateral Measures


                              usg efforts


    The United States has a broad range of sanctions in place 
including those enacted in 2003 and renewed in 2004: a ban on 
all imports from Burma; a ban on the export of financial 
services from the United States or by U.S. persons to Burma; 
and, an asset freeze on certain named Burmese institutions. The 
United States also expanded existing visa restrictions to 
include the managers of state-owned enterprises and their 
immediate family members. The Treasury Department reports that 
it blocked over $900,000 worth of transactions between October 
2004 and March 2005. Over the same period, the Treasury 
Department issued 42 licenses authorizing the release of 
blocked funds or otherwise prohibited transactions. By July 30, 
2003, U.S. banks maintaining correspondent accounts with 
Burmese banks had blocked the balances in those accounts, an 
amount that exceeds $320,000. Other measures put in place 
against the Burmese junta before 2003 include a ban on new 
investment in Burma, a ban on arms sales to Burma, limits on 
humanitarian assistance to Burma, and a provision directing 
relevant U.S. officials to vote ``no'' on loans or assistance 
to Burma by international financial institutions.
    Inside Burma, U.S. Embassy officials maintain frequent and 
active contacts with representatives of the democratic 
opposition and major ethnic groups to learn their views of the 
situation. Meetings with members of multilateral organizations 
and other diplomatic missions likewise help focus the 
international community's efforts in support of national 
reconciliation. Although Embassy officials have limited contact 
with Burmese Government officials due to the poor state of 
bilateral relations, even limited contact is important to 
urging reform and facilitating communication by all parties. 
The continued detention of senior officials of the NLD as well 
as over 1,300 political prisoners by the military junta blocks 
progress toward national reconciliation. The United States 
continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release 
of all political prisoners.
    The United States coordinates with other members of the 
international community in support of democratic change in 
Burma. The United States has consistently co-sponsored 
resolutions at the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on 
Human Rights that condemn the human rights situation in Burma 
and call for national reconciliation. Such resolutions support 
the efforts of UN Secretary General Special Envoy Razali Ismail 
and UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Sergio 
Pinheiro. U.S. representatives participate in other UN 
discussions on Burma. Then-Ambassador Danforth sent a letter to 
UN Secretary General Annan in November 2004 urging action on 
Burma. Similarly, U.S. participants in meetings of the ILO have 
been supportive of ILO efforts to eliminate the use of forced 
labor in Burma and to respect fundamental workers' rights.


                      efforts by other governments


    No other nation has imposed economic sanctions as severe as 
those imposed by the United States. Nonetheless, during 2003 
and 2004, many states indicated concern for the situation in 
Burma and instituted new or expanded measures to promote 
democracy and human rights. In 2003, the European Union (EU) 
expanded its existing visa and travel restrictions and its 
asset freeze list to include a broader set of Burmese who 
benefit from the oppressive policies of the junta. The EU also 
has in place a ban on arms sales and limits on assistance to 
the government. In April, the EU renewed measures announced in 
2004, including a ban on extending credit to a list of Burmese-
state run enterprises, and an even more restrictive visa ban. 
The EU also calls on its members to vote against assistance to 
Burma by international financial institutions, though they are 
not required to do so. The EU has traditionally drafted the 
annual General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights 
resolutions on Burma.
    The United Kingdom has called on its companies to review 
their investments in Burma. Canada has also expressed concern 
for the lack of progress in Burma and imposed visa and travel 
restrictions on Burmese officials following the May 30, 2003 
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters.
    Norway has sanctions similar to the EU, banning arms sales 
and enforcing a broad visa ban and asset freeze. In addition, 
Norway has been a supporter of the Burmese exile movement and 
hosts a radio service dedicated to providing uncensored 
information to those inside Burma.
    Japan has frozen all new development assistance to the 
government in response to the May 30 attacks. However, Japan 
does continue funding, on a case-by-case basis, certain 
humanitarian programs, democracy capacity-building projects, 
and those projects supporting economic structural reform. 
Senior Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Koizumi, 
have called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and progress 
toward democratization.
    Since May 30, 2003 Australia has deferred its recurring 
human rights training program and put certain agricultural 
assistance programs on hold. Australian officials have also 
called publicly for Aung San Suu Kyi's release.
    The majority of ASEAN members continue to consider events 
in Burma to be an internal matter, although there are 
indications some ASEAN governments are pressing Burmese leaders 
on democracy behind the scenes. The United States continues its 
dialogue with countries in the region and has made clear the 
important role that ASEAN has to play in encouraging reform. 
Administration officials have noted to ASEAN counterparts that 
the United States will not send senior representatives to ASEAN 
meetings hosted by Burma absent significant political reform.
    While we share with Thailand the goal of advancing 
democracy in Burma, our approaches differ. Thailand is unlikely 
to change its national policy of engagement or adopt sanctions 
against Rangoon. Thailand, however, has played a critical role 
for many years as a refuge to Burmese fleeing their country, 
and we have stressed to the Thai the importance of continuing 
to fulfill this role and supporting UNHCR in its work with 
Burmese refugees. The ``Bangkok Process,'' organized by 
Thailand in 2003, was a planned series of meetings of 
interested governments discussing the political situation in 
Burma with the Burmese Government. It is now moribund due to 
Burma's refusal to attend the meeting scheduled for April 2004.
    China continues to be Burma's primary financial, and one of 
its primary military, supporters. Chinese officials 
participated in the Bangkok Process, though they did not make 
any public statements critical of the government's 
presentation. China has, however, expressed support for 
national reconciliation. We have raised our concerns about 
Burma in discussions with China.
    India has neither provided strong public support for the 
democratic opposition nor called for an improvement in the 
human rights situation. Since the 1990s, India has vied with 
China for influence in Burma, sending high-level delegations, 
including a July 2003 visit by the Commerce Minister and a 
November 2003 visit by the Vice President, and offering 
significant financial and diplomatic support. Senior General 
Than Shwe paid a state visit to India in October 2004, during 
which several economic agreements and a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Non-Traditional Security were signed. Burma 
has also cooperated with India on the question of Indian 
insurgent groups operating out of Burmese territory.


                         united nations efforts


    The United States supports the work UN Special Envoy Razali 
Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. 
However, neither has been allowed to visit Burma in well over a 
year. Secretary General Kofi Annan hosted a meeting with 
interested governments in September 2004 to discuss the 
situation on the ground in Burma, The Secretary General has 
also issued a number of statements calling upon the Burmese 
authorities to include the democratic opposition in the 
National Convention and to release all political prisoners.
    The UN country team inside Burma has focused its efforts on 
a range of humanitarian issues. The United States backs UN 
initiatives to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, support returned 
refugees, and fight narcotics. The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and humanitarian 
assistance for the communities of Muslim Burmese in Northern 
Rakhine State [Rohingya] who have returned to Burma after 
fleeing to Bangladesh in 1991. UNHCR representatives continued 
efforts in eastern Burma to assess conditions for the large-
scale return of refugees from Thailand. U.S. officials in 
Rangoon maintain close communication with UN counterparts.

                 III. Effects of Trade-Related Measures


                    political and economic situation


    The junta continues to follow its seven-point ``roadmap to 
democracy,'' which it announced allowing international 
pressure, including new U.S. trade and financial sanctions, in 
2003. A key component of the roadmap is the National Convention 
to draft a new constitution. The junta handpicked pro-regime 
delegates to attend the Convention, refused to include the NLD 
or pro-democracy groups, and prohibited free and open debate. 
The Convention's most recent session adjourned on March 31, 
2005. Absent the participation of the democratic opposition and 
ethnic minority political groups, the National Convention does 
not reflect the true political aspirations of the Burmese 
people, nor does it serve as a real forum for the meaningful 
dialogue that is needed to achieve genuine national 
reconciliation. Given these deep flaws, any constitution that 
emerges from the National Convention, and any subsequent 
referendum or general election would by extension lack 
legitimacy, and would not constitute meaningful steps toward 
the establishment of democracy in Burma. The junta has not 
announced a timetable for a transition to democracy.
    In December 2004, the junta extended the detention of Aung 
San Suu Kyi for an additional year, and restricted her access 
to medical care and contacts with the outside world, leaving 
her virtually incommunicado. In February 2005, authorities also 
extended the detention of National League for Democracy Vice 
Chairman U Tin Oo, and arrested Hkun Htun Oo, head of the Shan 
Nationalities League for Democracy--Burma's second largest 
political party.
    In recent months, there have been limited contacts between 
the military junta and Burma's largest remaining ethnic 
insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU). If a final 
agreement between the parties is reached, it could end over 
five decades of conflict, and could open up Karen and Mon 
states for badly needed international economic and humanitarian 
assistance and the eventual voluntary repatriation of thousands 
of refugees from Thailand with UNHCR involvement and the return 
home of thousands of internally displaced persons. Over twenty 
groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the junta.
    The Burmese junta's dismal economic policies have led to 
widespread poverty and the flight of most foreign investors 
from the country. Likewise, Burma's dreadful employment 
situation reflects decades of economic mismanagement by the 
Burmese Government. However, the 2003 U.S. ban on Burmese 
imports had an impact on at least one sector of the economy: 
the garment industry. The result was the closure of more than 
100 garment factories, which had already been in dire economic 
straits before losing the U.S. market. There was an initial 
estimated loss of around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs. However, new 
orders from importers in EU member countries, Canada and Latin 
America helped remaining factories continue production and 
factories that had previously closed to re-hire some workers.


                              human rights


    Despite the Burmese Government's purported desire to make 
progress toward democracy, its extremely poor human rights 
record has worsened over the past year, and it has continued to 
commit serious abuses. The State Department produces an annual 
report on the human rights situation in Burma. In 2004, the 
report noted that the Burmese Government's extremely poor human 
rights record continued to deteriorate. The junta extended for 
at least another year the unjustified detentions of Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate and leader of the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Vice Chair U Tin Oo. The report 
also noted that citizens of Burma still do not have the right 
to change their government, and that security forces have 
continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly 
relocate persons, use forced labor, and reestablish forced 
conscription of the civilian population into militia units. The 
military junta continues to be hostile to all forms of 
political opposition. With the exception of its Rangoon 
headquarters, all of the NLD's offices remain closed. Arrests 
and disappearances of political activists continue, and members 
of the security forces torture, beat, and otherwise abuse 
prisoners and detainees. The government has allowed two visits 
by Amnesty International (the latest in 2003) and maintained 
cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
    Our expanded sanctions represent a clear and powerful 
expression of American opposition to the developments in Burma 
over the past two years and signal strong support for the pro-
democracy movement. Sanctions are a key component of our policy 
in bringing democracy to Burma and have been a key source of 
support for the morale of many democracy activists.

    IV. Effects of Sanctions Policy on Broader Policy Interests and 
                               Relations

    U.S. steadfastness sends a clear signal to the junta of 
U.S. support for change. The measures in place have the broad 
backing of Burmese democracy activists.
    Although the EU and others have taken some steps, no other 
country has taken measures as strong as those of the United 
States. We continue diplomatic efforts at all levels to urge 
other countries to adopt broad sanctions similar to ours or 
other targeted approaches to dealing with Burma. We have found 
that many in the international community have a different view 
on how best to achieve our shared goals in Burma.
    The trade-related sanctions implemented pursuant to the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 have had a limited 
impact on U.S. relations with other nations. Although some 
foreign businesses and their representative embassies have 
complained about the impact on their operations, all who have 
invested in Burma have done so recognizing the difficult 
operating environment and overall poor economic climate 
fostered by the junta. Furthermore, many U.S. and other 
companies had already pulled out of Burma prior to the passage 
of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.
    The NLD remains very supportive of U.S. sanctions and urges 
additional steps to pressure the government. However, some 
other opposition politicians have questioned whether the 
sanctions have any chance of success without the participation 
of ASEAN and other regional countries and, if not, whether they 
are worth the pain caused to Burmese workers.

                               Conclusion

    International pressure and support for the Burmese 
democracy movement continues to be essential for promoting 
change in Burma. However, the import ban implemented in 2003 
would be far more effective if countries importing Burma's 
high-value exports (such as natural gas and timber), which also 
tend to have closer economic links with the SPDC, would join us 
in our actions. Other U.S. measures, such as the ban on new 
investment in Burma and the ban on the export of financial 
services to Burma, would also be more effective were the EU and 
others to take similar steps. The Administration remains 
unwavering in its support for the establishment of democracy 
and a greatly improved human rights situation in Burma.

              II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION


               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 12, 2005.
Hon. Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 18, approving 
the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Emily 
Schlect.
            Sincerely,
                                       Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

S.J. Res. 18--Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in 
        the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

    Summary: S.J. Res. 18 would renew for one year the ban of 
all imports from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) and was 
set to expire on July 28, 2004. Public Law 108-272 renewed the 
ban for one year through its current expiration on July 28, 
2005. The import restrictions may be lifted if the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC), the military regime of Burma, 
has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations 
of human rights, implemented a democratic government, and met 
its obligations under international counter-narcotics 
agreements. The President also would have the authority to 
terminate the restrictions upon the request of a democratically 
elected government in Burma or waive them in the national 
interest. CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports 
from Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 
in 2005 and by $1 million in 2006, with no effect thereafter. 
CBO estimates enacting S.J. Res. 18 would not affect federal 
spending.
    By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18 
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot estimate the cost of 
those mandates for two reasons. First, information on the value 
of lost profits to importers resulting from the ban are not 
available. Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO should 
measure the cost of extending a mandate relative to the 
mandate's current costs or assume that the mandate will expire 
and measure the costs of the mandate's extension as if the 
requirement were new. For those reasons, CBO cannot determine 
whether the aggregate direct cost of the mandates would exceed 
the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in 
UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
    S.J. Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or 
tribal governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S.J. Res. 18 is shown in the following 
table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
                                                              2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues........................................    (\1\)       -1        0        0        0        0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Loss of less than $500,000.

    Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 18, the President would 
have the authority to lift or waive the ban that would be 
imposed by the resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that 
the President would not exercise this authority before the 
termination of the one-year ban.
    Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission 
on recent U.S. imports from Burma, information from several 
government agencies, and CBO's most recent forecast of total 
U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 18 would 
reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 2005 and by $1 
million in 2006, net of income and payroll tax offsets.
    In recent years, over half of all U.S. imports from Burma 
have been knitted or crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The 
remaining imports include apparel items not knitted or 
crocheted, certain types of fish and crustaceans, goods made of 
wood, certain precious and semiprecious stones and metals, and 
woven fabrics and tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 
percent of duties collected on these imports came from knitted 
and crocheted articles. CBO assumes that most of the banned 
imports would be replaced with imports from other countries.
    The President could remove the ban on imports upon the 
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if 
he were to determine and notify Congress that to do so is in 
the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. companies 
would be allowed to resume importation of goods produced, 
manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. It is unclear 
whether or when the President would exercise the authority to 
lift or waive the ban on imports from Burma. If such an action 
were taken during the 2005-2006 period, the impact on federal 
revenues would be reduced accordingly.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: By renewing the ban 
on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18 would impose private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA. CBO cannot estimate the 
cost of those mandates for two reasons. First, information on 
the value of lost profits to importers resulting from the ban 
are not available. Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO 
should measure the cost of extending a mandate relative to the 
mandate's current costs or assume that the mandate will expire 
and measure the costs of the mandate's extension as if the 
requirement were new. For those reasons, CBO cannot determine 
whether the aggregate direct cost of the mandates would exceed 
the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in 
UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments: 
S.J. Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Revenues: Emily Schlect. 
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa 
Merrell. Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant 
Director for Tax Analysis.

    III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states 
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any 
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy 
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional 
paperwork.
    The following information is provided in accordance with 
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
(Pub. L. No. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions 
of S.J. Res. 18 as approved by the Committee on June 29, 2005. 
In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. No. 104-04, the 
Committee has determined that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would 
not affect the budgets of State, local, or tribal governments.

                      IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

    Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law 
made by S.J. Res. 18, as ordered reported.